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EASTERN EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCER

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US-Hungarian Relations Move Out of the Icebox

Secretary of State Rogers' visit to Budapest, which begins today, will chalk up several "firsts" placing US-Hungarian relations at a post-World War II pinnacle. Rogers is the first Cabinet official to visit Budapest since the War and probably the first Secretary of State ever to visit the country. Similarly, the consular convention that he is supposed to sign tomorrow will mark the conclusion of the first bilateral treaty since the 1947 peace treaty.

Budapest's desire to make the most of the visit was shown by its willingness to write a consular treaty in quick fashion. During the final week's negotiating sessions, a constructive Hungarian attitude allowed the inclusion of liberal provisions on access to detained nationals and compromises on the handling of dual nationals and the administration of estates. The Hungarian willingness to compromise on the delicate problem of dual nationalities was especially significant because many of the persons so categorized are those who left Hungary in 1956. The compromise includes "statements of practice" for the negotiating record, but outside the text of the treaty itself.

Budapest undoubtedly views successful talks with the Secretary as a symbolic normalization of ties which could initiate a prolonged--and, heretofore, nonexistent--dialogue with Washington. Although the Hungarians will be most careful to stay in line with Moscow's detente pace, they ultimately hope for movement in economic fields. In this context, perhaps the main point that Budapest will try to make to the Secretary is Hungary's unique and extreme dependence on foreign trade - both imports and exports.

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Students' Trial Postponed

The trial of four student nationalists for their part in last December's crisis in Croatia opened yesterday in Zagreb [redacted] and then promptly adjourned for one month on a defense motion that it be given more time to prepare its case. Yesterday's action was the first move in the legal maneuvering which could turn the case into a long, drawn-out affair. Even after the court returns a verdict, a series of defense appeals could take the case to the Yugoslav Supreme Court--a process that could take a year or more. [redacted]

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Good Turnout for July 4 Reception in Warsaw

About 550 guests attended and the atmosphere was warm and friendly. High-ranking Polish government and military figures appeared in greater numbers than usual. Five ministers (Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, Finance, Culture and Agriculture), three vice ministers and several others attended on the civilian side and among the military four general officers showed up. The Embassy comments that this high-level turnout is apparently designed to show Warsaw's awareness of the improved state of US-Polish relations and an interest in continuing the trend. The President's science adviser, Dr. David, is due to arrive Saturday for a five day official visit. [redacted]

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Pankow's Foreign Minister Pushes Hard Line with Bonn

East German Foreign Minister Otto Winzer has assumed the role of devil's advocate during the East-West German political talks by taking a seemingly harder line on several issues than negotiator Kohl does in his meetings with Bahr. This became abruptly obvious during the 28-29 June session when Winzer met with Bahr and harangued him on GDR-FRG relations.

The East German weekly Horizont on 2 July carried an article by Winzer in which he expressed his views on how these relations should proceed. Winzer raised the possibility that the talks would be "slowed" if Bonn

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continued to block GDR membership in international organizations and recognition of East Germany by other states, a "threat" that Kohl had made earlier but then dropped. Winzer also asserted that GDR sovereignty had been recognized by the FRG and the four powers in various agreements, including the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, and that GDR relations with the FRG were not affected by "other agreements." Winzer's wording seems to imply a strict interpretation, if not backpeddling on, Kohl's offer to accept implicitly the validity of Potsdam and other post-war agreements involving the two Germanies.

Winzer also hinted at a desire for the three western allies to normalize relations with the GDR as the Soviet Union has done. The East Germans have not surfaced this idea in their talks with the West Germans but might eventually consider it a useful ploy if they feel Bonn is foot-dragging. Kohl has already tweaked Bahr with a remark, unsubstantiated, that "some" of the allies had sounded Pankow out on the idea.

Winzer's arguments are often convoluted and do not contradict the East German negotiating position outright, but they may be designed to limit a liberal interpretation of "concessions" offered by Kohl in the talks.

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